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THE SPRATLY ISLANDS DISPUTE AND THE
LAW OF THE SEA
David Whiting*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which went
into effect on November 16, 1994, designates the Earth's ocean areas as
being part of the common heritage of mankind, and sets forth the goals
of finding peaceful and equitable solutions to disagreements regarding
sovereignty over disputed territories and to establishing equal access to
the Earth's marine resources.1 In furtherance of these goals, the Con-
vention contains provisions granting the state which has sovereignty
over an island group the right to exploit its natural resources, and an
entire part containing dispute resolution mechanisms to aid in the
resolution of conflicts over disputed territories and their resources.
There are few places in the world that provide a greater challenge to
the dispute resolution mechanisms of the Law of the Sea than the
South China Sea's Spratly Islands.
The islands were first mapped by the British in the 1880's,2 and are
now claimed by six nations: The People's Republic of China (PRC), The
Republic of China (Taiwan), Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Phil-
ippines. 3 Although all of these claims have a historical basis, the pri-
mary reasons for the claims are the islands strategic location and their
potential oil and gas reserves.
4
Considering the amount of attention they have received from
nearby countries, the islands themselves are small and physically in-
significant by any standard. The total area of the 100 or so islets that
comprise the Spratlys is less than five square kilometers, 5 the largest of
* J.D., 1997, University of Denver, College of Law.
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, preamble, 21
I.L.M. 1261, 1271 [hereinafter Law of the Sea].
2. Teh-Kuang Chang, China's Claim Over Spratly and Paracel Islands: A Historical
and Legal Perspective, 23 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 399, 400 n. 8 (1991).
3. Michael Bennett, The People's Republic of China and the Use of International
Law in the Spratly Islands Dispute, 28 STAN. J. INT'L LAW 425, 425 (1992).
4. Roberto R. Romulo, Philippine Foreign Policy: New Policy in a Changing World
Environment, 17-SUM FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 131, 133.
5. U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 1992 WORLD FACTBOOK 318 (1992), cited in
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the islands being only .43 kilometers square.6 Bearing in mind that the
islands are spread over a 200,000 square mile area (518,000 square
kilometers), it seems clear that these islands, despite their strategic
importance, are actually very small, and that the dispute over them is
driven by the desire on the part of the various parties to profit from po-
tential oil reserves and control the South China Sea.
7
The goal of this paper is to examine the claims on the Spratly Is-
lands that are made by the PRC and Vietnam in light of the signing of
the Convention on the Law of the Sea by both countries. The scope of
the paper will be limited to the claims made by the PRC and Vietnam
because, of the claimants, they are the two nations between whom ten-
sions over the Spratlys are highest. In addition, they are the nations
who are most actively pursuing their goals of possessing and economi-
cally exploiting the islands. Finally, this paper will discuss the impact
of the dispute resolution provisions contained in the Law of the Sea on
the possible resolution of the disagreement between the PRC and Viet-
nam over the Spratly Islands.
II. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Article 293(1) of the Law of the Sea states that when a territorial
dispute is being settled using the Law, "[a] court or tribunal having ju-
risdiction under this section shall apply this Convention and other rules
of international law not incompatible with this Convention" when set-
tling the dispute.8 This language clearly indicates that previously ex-
isting international law is to be taken into account when settling terri-
torial disputes under the Law of the Sea.
Since the turn of the century, there have been three cases that have
demonstrated what courts base their decisions on in cases involving ter-
ritorial disputes over islands.9
In The Island of Palmas, the United States and the Netherlands
agreed to arbitrate their conflicting claims of ownership of islands in
the southern part of the Philippines. The United States claimed that
the islands had been given to it by the Spanish at the end of the Span-
ish-American War. In effect, the claim was based on Spain's claim to
Richard D. Belier, Note, Analyzing the Relationship Between International Law and In-
ternational Politics in China's and Vietnam's Territorial Dispute Over the Spratly Islands,
29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 293, 295 (1994).
6. Tao Cheng, The Dispute Over the South China Seas Islands, 10 TEX. INT'L L.J.
265, 267 (1975).
7. Bennett, supra note 3, at 429.
8. Law of the Sea, supra note 1, art. 293, 21 I.L.M. at 1324.
9. See Beller, supra note 5, at 303-4.
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the islands by their discovery in the 16th century. 10 The Dutch claimed
that the islands had been given to the Dutch East Indies Company as
tribute by native princes."
After examining the competing claims, the arbitrator ruled in favor
of the Dutch on the grounds that although Spain has discovered the is-
lands, they had not taken sufficient steps to protect against their use by
the Dutch. Since the Dutch used the islands on a regular basis, the
court held that their title was superior to that of Spain and by exten-
sion, the United States, and that the Netherlands would retain sover-
eignty over the islands.'
2
This doctrine was refined in the Sovereignty Over Clipperton Is-
land, a case between France and Mexico. 13 In this case, the French
claimed the rights to an island in the Pacific Ocean due to its discovery
by a French Naval Officer in 1858, after which the French did not use
or visit the island until 1897. They did, however, survey the island
during their 1858 expedition, and upon their arrival in Hawaii, their
next port of call, placed a notice in the newspaper notifying interested
parties that the island had been claimed by France. 14
In 1897, a French Naval Ship which had been ordered to inspect
the island found three Americans on the island excavating guano for a
San Francisco company. France promptly protested to the United
States, which replied that it had not granted any concession to the men
and that it had no claims to the island. A month later, a Mexican vessel
stopped at the island and forced the Americans to raise the Mexican
flag, claiming that the island belonged to Mexico. Upon hearing of this,
the French protested to the Mexicans, and the parties agreed to have
the case settled through arbitration.15
In this case, the arbitrator ruled for France on the grounds that the
French had taken sufficient steps to protect their claim by publishing
notice of the claim and protesting unauthorized exploitation of the is-
lands resources by the Americans whom they found on the island. This
modified the Island of Palmas ruling insofar as the arbitrator did not
require France to make use of the island, as Spain had been required to
do. In the case of Clipperton Island, all that was required of the French
was that they publicize their claim to the island and exclude others
from it.16
10. Philip C. Jessup, The Palmas Island Arbitration, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 735, 737
(1928).
11. Id., at 735.
12. Beller, supra note 5, at 303-4.
13. Sovereignty Over Clipperton Island (Fr. v. Mex.), 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932).
14. Id., at 391.
15. Id., at 391-92.
16. Id., at 391-94.
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The international law standard was further modified in 1933 in the
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland.17 In this case, the Permanent Court
of International Justice held that if the territory in question was unin-
habited due to its remote location and unfavorable climate, occupation
is not required in order to retain sovereignty of the territory and that
protests and the exclusion of others are sufficient.
Taken as a whole, these cases lead to the conclusion that in order to
establish sovereignty over an island, a nation needs to establish title to
the islands through discovery and, except in the case of inhospitable
territory, needs to protect the title through use.
Examining China and Vietnam's claims on the islands in light of
international case law is a task that could only be done adequately in a
paper exclusively devoted to that analysis.1 8 For the purposes of this
paper, however, a brief overview will suffice to demonstrate that both
parties have claims which meet the criteria for sovereignty established
in the cases discussed above.
China's claim to the Spratlys dates back to their discovery by the
Chinese in the second century B.C., which was shortly followed by the
establishment of Chinese administration over the islands. 19 Following
their initial discovery and use of the islands, the Chinese sent numer-
ous expeditions to the islands, starting in about 111 B.C.20 In addition
to governmental use and exploration of the islands, the Chinese point to
the fact that fishermen from Hainan used the Spratlys as emergency or
seasonal homes throughout this period. This use would strengthen the
Chinese claim. 21 Perhaps more importantly, the Provincial Government
of Kwangtung issued five licenses between 1921 and 1932 for the ex-
ploitation of the islands resources. 22
Starting in 1883, China's claim to the Spratlys was recognized by
European powers. Of particular note is a survey by Germany conducted
in 1883 which was stopped after protest from the Chinese govern-
17. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No 53,
cited in Beller, supra note 5, at 304, n.103.
18. See generally Bennett, supra note 3 (discussing China's historical claims to the
Spratly Islands and its attitude regarding international legal norms in relation to the dis-
pute); Chang, supra note 2 (includes an exhaustive discussion of China's historical claims
to the islands in addition to legal analysis of the different legal claims made by China);
Cheng, supra note 6 (provides a more succinct overview of China and Vietnam's claims to
the islands).
19. Chang, supra note 2 at 403. (Chang notes that his accounts of the Chinese discov-
ery and use of the islands are based on Chinese history books. Bearing this in mind, it
may be that these sources overstate the Chinese claim somewhat, as I was unable to find
other articles that verify the dates in this article).
20. Id.
21. Cheng, supra note 6 at 274.
22. Id.
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ment.23 Following this, use of the islands by Chinese fisherman from
Hainan was documented by the British and the French, and French oc-
cupation of nine of the islands was met with official protest from the
Chinese in 1932.24
At the end of World War II, the Japanese, who had occupied the
islands during the war, formally renounced their claim to the islands
and surrendered them to the Republic of China at the signing of the
San Francisco Peace Treaty on September 8, 1951.25 Understandably,
the Chinese place a great deal of emphasis on the fact that the Japa-
nese surrendered the island to the Chinese, and not to the French, who
had occupied some of the islands prior to their seizure by the Japanese
in 1939.26 This is especially important because the Vietnamese claim to
the islands is based in part on the French occupation of the islands from
1932 until 1939.
Since World War II, both the PRC and the Republic of China have
maintained garrisons on the islands 27 and have taken steps to maintain
the validity of their claims on the islands.28 The most dramatic exam-
ple of China's assertion of its sovereignty over the islands was a naval
engagement that occurred in 1988 when Chinese patrol craft opened
fire on three Vietnamese freighters delivering supplies to a Vietnamese
outpost on one of the islands.29 Most recently, the People's Republic of
China has built what it claims are shelters for fishermen on what is
perhaps appropriately called Mischief Reef. This activity has been met
with strong objections by the Philippines, which claim the reef as a part
of Palawan Province, and which claims that the structure is in fact a
naval support installation. 30 In addition to this, in 1992 the Chinese
Parliament passed a Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone on February 25, explicitly claiming the Spratlys as a part of
China. 31
23. Chang, supra note 2 at 405.
24. Id., at 406.
25. Cheng, supra note 6 at 275.
26. Id.
27. Although both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan)
maintain forces on the islands, this paper only addresses the claims made by the PRC for
two reasons. First, the PRC has been the more aggressive of the two in pursuing its
claim. Second, since both the PRC and Taiwan only recognize the existence of one China,
and since the PRC is a member of the UN and Taiwan is not, it seems logical to concen-
trate on the PRC's claim, understanding that the PRC has acquired Taiwan's claim
through the process of state succession. See Beller, supra note 5 at 307-8.
28. Id., at 295 (All of the nations in the dispute maintain garrisons on the islands ex-
cept for Brunei. In addition to its garrison, Malaysia has built a hotel on one of the is-
lands. Id. at 310).
29. Bennett, supra note 3 at 427.
30. Philippines: Manila Rules Out Armed Response in Spratlys, Reuters, Feb. 10,
1995, available in WESTLAW, Int-News Database.
31. Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 25 February 1992, adopted
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Vietnam's claims to the islands do not have as extensive a history
as those of the Chinese. They are based in large part on Vietnam's con-
tinuation of French claims and French actions in the South China Sea
during Vietnam's colonial period.
The French first contested Chinese sovereignty over the Spratly
Islands in 1933, when the French Foreign Ministry announced that
France had occupied six of the islands since 1930, and asserted French
authority over them. It is not clear what the legal grounds for the
French action were, but some commentators have speculated that the
French considered the islands to be terra nullis even though they found
Chinese living there when they arrived.
32
Like China, France's priorities changed during World War II, and
as a result, the French claim to the Spratly Islands does not appear to
have been raised until well after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. 33
The Vietnamese first acted to strengthen their claim in 1956, when the
South Vietnamese government placed a garrison on Spratly Island.
This was followed by a declaration stating that the entire Spratly ar-
chipelago was a part of Vietnam's Phuoc Tuy Province.
34
After the fall of Saigon in 1975, the Vietnamese government in Ha-
noi restated the claims made by the South Vietnamese government and
sent troops to the Spratlys to increase the number of islands under its
control.35 More recently, the Vietnamese government issued a state-
ment which reiterates the Vietnamese claim to the islands and places
these islands within the baselines of Vietnam's territorial sea. 36 In
1992, Vietnam took steps to strengthen its claim to the islands by con-
ducting surveys of the islands and signing an agreement with a Norwe-
gian oil company for the exploration and drilling rights to the islands. 3
7
Although the Chinese claim to the islands would appear to be the
stronger of the two, based on its earlier claim of discovery and its nearly
continuous use of the islands since the second century B.C., the Viet-
namese insist that the islands are theirs, and state that the Chinese
claims are not valid. In light of the rising tensions between the coun-
tries over the islands, it seems clear that one of the few ways in which a
by the Standing Committee of the People's Congress, reprinted in The Law of the Sea:
Current Developments in State Practice (No. III), at 26-9.
32. Cheng, supra note 6 at 268-69.
33. Id., at 269-70.
34. Bennett, supra note 3 at 439.
35. Id.
36. Statement of 12 November 1982 by the Government of the Socialist Republic of
Viet Nam on the territorial sea baseline of Viet Nam, reprinted in The Law of the Sea:
Current Developments in State Practice (No. I), at 143-44 (Previously circulated as UN
document A/37/697 of 6 December 1982).
37. Beller, supra note 5 at 297.
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peaceful resolution can be reached is through arbitration. The dispute
settlement provisions of the Law of the Sea are designed for these kinds
of disputes. Since all of the major parties in the Spratly Islands dispute
are signatories to the Law of the Sea Convention it is only natural that
our attention turn to the impact of the Law of the Sea on the existing
international law.
38
III. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
Under the Law of the Sea, disputes concerning the implementation
or application of the Convention must be settled using Convention and
international law not incompatible with it.39 Simply put, the Law of the
Sea incorporates existing international law into it and refines it. Of
particular interest in this dispute are the articles of the Law of the Sea
that define the territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone,
and the continental shelf, and their impact on the existing law.
Under Article Two of the Law of the Sea, "[t]he sovereignty of a
coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters.. .to
an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea."40 The Law of
the Sea also establishes the contiguous zone, within which the coastal
state may enforce its laws to the extent necessary to punish the viola-
tion of those laws. 41 By granting the coastal state sovereignty within its
territorial sea and the right to enforce its laws within the contiguous
zone (which includes the territorial sea), the Law of the Sea grants the
coastal state the exclusive right to authorize the exploitation of any
natural resources within those areas.
In addition to the territorial sea and the contiguous zone, the Law
of the Sea grants the coastal state "sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural re-
sources" within the exclusive economic zone of the coastal state, an area
extending 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the territo-
rial sea is measured. 42 The coastal state also has the right to authorize
the construction of artificial islands, which, under Article 60, includes
oil rigs and other structures necessary for the economic development of
the economic zone under Article 56.43
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Law of the Sea grants
the coastal state the sovereign right to develop the natural resources on
38. Except for Brunei, which did not sign either the final act of the Conference or the
Convention. See 21 I.L.M. 1447.
39. Law of the Sea, supra note 1, art. 293, 21 I.L.M. at 1324.
40. Id., art. 2, 21 I.L.M. at 1272.
41. Id., art. 33, 21 I.L.M. at 1276.
42. Id., art. 56(1)(a), 21 I.L.M. at 1279; art. 57, 21 I.L.M. at 1279.
43. Id., art. 56(1)(b), 21 I.L.M. at 1279.
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the State's continental shelf.44 The continental shelf is an area, most
often extending beyond the contiguous zone, that
comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that
extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural pro-
longation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continen-
tal margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does
not extend up to that distance.
45
In Article 76(6), the Convention states that regardless of the provi-
sions of Article 76(1), that a State's continental shelf area cannot extend
further than 350 nautical miles.
46
The effect of adopting these provisions has been to raise the impor-
tance of the Spratlys by granting the state that has sovereignty over
them the right to exploit the natural resources within a 350-nautical-
mile radius of the islands, an area that includes much of the South
China Sea.
However, there are also portions of the Law of the Sea which would
appear to mitigate the effects of Articles 2, 33, 56, and 77 by redefining
what an island is, thus diminishing the strategic and economic impor-
tance of some islands relative to what their status would have been
prior to the adoption of the Law of the Sea in 1982.
Article 121 defines what constitutes an island under the Law of the
Sea. Using the definition in this article, it would seem that all but the
largest of the Spratlys are not islands under the Law of the Sea, and
therefore do not have a territorial sea of their own and cannot be used
when determining the boundaries of the territorial sea, exclusive eco-
nomic zone, or the continental shelf.
Specifically, Article 121 states that "[an island is a naturally
formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high
tide." Furthermore, in order to be considered an island, the land must
be capable of sustaining "human habitation or economic life of their
own."47 Article 60(8) states that "[a]rtificial islands, installations, and
structures, do not have the status of islands," and that because of this,
they cannot "affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, exclusive eco-
nomic zone, or the continental shelf."48
These articles have an important impact on the Spratlys primarily
because they have the potential to reduce the exclusive economic zone
44. Id., art. 77(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1285.
45. Id., art. 76(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1285.
46. Id., art. 76(6), 21 I.L.M. at 1285.
47. Id., art. 121(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1291.
48. Id., art 60(8), 21 I.L.M. at 1279.
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and continental shelf areas of the islands significantly. According to
the CIA's World Factbook, the Spratly Islands consist of "islets, coral
reefs, and sea mounts" many of which are submerged at high tide and
are therefore not considered islands under Article 121. 49 The fact that
Article 60(8) clearly states that artificial islands such as the ones that
have been built by the Chinese and Vietnamese will not affect the de-
limitation of the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf means
that although the structures may strengthen their respective claims
through use of the islands, they will not aid them in establishing the
right to exploit some of the resources that would be within the exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf if the structures were considered in
the delimitation.
Furthermore, even if the islands which the Law of the Sea allows to
be taken into account for the delimitation of the exclusive economic
zone and continental shelf are arranged in such a way as to maintain
the original geographic dimensions of the archipelago, there is some
question as to whether or not they can sustain human habitation or
economic life as required by Article 121. One could certainly argue that
since it is possible for men to live year-round on Antarctica, it is cer-
tainly possible to sustain life on the Spratlys, given sufficient planning
and resources. The existence of the various garrisons of the islands
seem to bear this out. A close reading of Article 121, however, seems to
point to the conclusion that the drafters of the Law of the Sea intended
that the life on the islands be self-sustaining, and not dependent on
regular shipment of supplies from Beijing, Hanoi, Manila, or Kuala
Lumpur. The article is quite clear in this respect, stating that "[riocks
which cannot sustain human habitation.. .of their own shall have no ex-
clusive economic zone or continental shelf."50 This interpretation of Ar-
ticle 121 would seem to preclude the majority of the Spratly "Islands"
from being classified as islands under the Law of the Sea, thereby pre-
venting them from playing a substantial role in the delimitation of the
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
Additionally, leaving aside considerations such as the strategic lo-
cation of the islands and the national pride that the nations involved
seem to attach to remaining on the islands, it is questionable whether
or not it is economically feasible to maintain a population on the is-
lands. In large part, this will depend on the feasibility of removing oil
from the surrounding area.
The view that application of the Law of the Sea to the Spratlys
lessens their importance is reinforced by the provisions of the Law of
the Sea that address the status of archipelagos.
49. U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 1992 WORLD FACTBOOK 318 (1992), cited
in Belier, supra note 5.
50. Law of the Sea, supra note 1, art. 121, 21 I.L.M. at 1291 (emphasis added).
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Article 46 of the Law of the Sea defines an archipelago as "a group
of islands.. .which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters
and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and
political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such."51 On
reflection, it is not clear that the Spratlys fit into the Law of the Sea's
definition of an archipelago. The geographic unity of the islands is cast
into doubt by the Philippines' claim that islands claimed by them form
an island group that is distinct from the Spratlys chain. 52 The economic
unity of the islands is debatable since there is no trade between the dif-
ferent islands. At this time, the only economic activity on the islands is
the collection of guano and fishing. Finally, it appears clear that al-
though several nations claim all of the islands, the Spratlys have never
been unified under one country's rule. These arguments seem a bit
formalistic in light of the fact that despite the conflicting claims of sov-
ereignty and dividing lines that break the Spratlys up, they are re-
garded as an archipelago by the majority of the claimants.
The Law of the Sea provides that the baselines of an archipelago
may be drawn from the outermost points of the outermost islands and
drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are
included the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of
water to the area of land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1.53
Using data taken from Michael Bennett's article, The People's Re-
public of China and the Use of International Law in the Spratly Islands
Dispute, and the CIA's 1992 World Factbook, it would appear that the
ratio of water to land falls far short of the required amount.54 Although
it is unclear how the baselines for the Spratly archipelago would have
to be drawn in order to bring them within Article 47's requirements, it
is apparent that the area within the baselines would be substantially
smaller than what has been traditionally regarded as being the area of
the Spratly Islands, and that this would result within a corresponding
reduction in the dimensions of the exclusive economic zone and the con-
tinental shelf.
Looking back on the decisions made in the Island of Palmas, Sover-
eignty Over Clipperton Island, and Legal Status of Eastern Greenland,
one is forced to wonder if the islands in question would even be consid-
51. Id., art. 46, 21 I.L.M. 1278.
52. Romulo, supra note 4, at 133.
53. Law of the Sea, supra note 1, art 47(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1278.
54. See Bennett, supra note 3, at 429 (states that the islands are "500 miles from
north to south and 400 miles from east to west," bringing the total area to 200,000 square
miles, or 518,000 square kilometers); U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 1992 World
Factbook 318 (1992), cited in Beller, supra note 5 at 295 (states that the total land area of
the islands is "less than 5 km2 ."). Using these numbers, the ratio of water to land comes
out to roughly 103,000 km2 of water for every square kilometer of land, far outside the
limits set by Article 47(1).
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ered islands in the first two cases. While the Law of the Sea states that
disputes concerning its interpretation and implementation must be set-
tled in accordance with international law, it seems clear that the defini-
tions contained in the Law of the Sea will have a limiting effect on the
circumstances in which this law can be used.
IV. DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER THE LAW OF THE SEA
Articles 74 and 83 of the Law of the Sea state that when there is
disagreement concerning the delimitation of the exclusive economic
zone (Article 74) or continental shelf (Article 83), the states must try to
reach an agreement under Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (hereinafter "ICJ").55 In turn, Article 38 of the ICJ
Statute requires that disputes brought before the ICJ be settled in ac-
cordance with international conventions recognized by the states, inter-
national custom, and general principles of law in such a way as to ar-
rive at a just and fair decision.
56
If the parties to the dispute cannot reach a settlement through ne-
gotiations within a reasonable time, Articles 74 and 83 state that they
may "resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV."57 Part XV obli-
gates the parties to settle their disputes in a peaceful manner, in keep-
ing with Article 2(3) of the U.N. Charter and to find solutions to the
dispute using the non-violent means listed in Article 33(1) of the Char-
ter.58 All of these provisions incorporate current international law into
the Law of the Sea and reaffirm the support of the signing countries for
the principles set out in the U.N. Charter and other sources of interna-
tional law.
With the exception of China, the parties to the Spratly Islands dis-
pute have taken steps to demonstrate their willingness to resolve the
conflict in a manner consistent with the U.N. Charter. In particular,
the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
signed declarations in 1988 and 1992 reaffirming their commitment to
finding a peaceful solution to the Spratly Islands dispute.
The Manila Declaration, signed by the ASEAN nations in 1988
states that "[i]ntra-regional disputes shall be settled by peaceful means
in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia and the United Nations Charter."59 Although the pri-
mary purpose of the Manila Declaration was to "provide a consensus
55. Law of the Sea, supra note 1, art. 74(1), 21 I.L.M. 1284; Id., art 83(1), 21 I.L.M.
1286.
56. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38.
57. Law of the Sea, supra note 1 art. 74(2), 21 I.L.M. at 1284; Id., art. 83(2), 21 I.L.M.
1286.
58. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3; U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1.
59. Manila Declaration of 1987, Dec. 15, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 603, 603 (1988).
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framework for the avoidance of conflict and the pursuit of peaceful co-
operation," the reactions from the non-ASEAN parties to the dispute
was mixed.60 Vietnam, an ASEAN observer at the meeting, expressed
its full support for the declaration. China, on the other hand, said that
it would be willing to enter into negotiations "when the conditions be-
came ripe," an ominous statement that could be interpreted as meaning
"whenever it suits our interests. " 61
The Manila Declaration was followed four years later by the Singa-
pore Declaration, which restated many of the themes of the Manila
Declaration. Although the Singapore Declaration was focused more on
economic cooperation than on security matters, the members of ASEAN
did extend an invitation to other states in the ASEAN region to sign
ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, 62 which includes provisions
for establishing a regional system of peaceful dispute resolution similar
to the European Court of Justice. 63 Both of these declarations are in-
dicative of the willingness of some of the parties to the dispute to settle
the dispute in a peaceful manner, in keeping with the spirit of the U.N.
Charter and the Law of the Sea.
Under Section 1 of Part XV, the first step in the settlement of a
dispute is to have one of the parties to the dispute initiate conciliation
proceedings by inviting the parties to the dispute to have the matter
settled under the voluntary procedures of Annex V.64 These proceed-
ings are considered to be finished when the parties fail to agree on the
procedure of the conciliation proceedings or when the invitation is not
accepted. 65 Given the fact that neither Vietnam or China have initiated
conciliation proceedings, it does not seen likely that voluntary concilia-
tion proceedings will provide a solution to the dispute between these
two nations over the Spratlys.
If anything, China seems confident that it can successfully back its
claim to the Spratlys through military posturing and intimidation. In
recent years, the Chinese have taken steps to transform their navy from
being primarily a coastal defense fleet to being a blue water fleet capa-
ble of projecting power into the South China Sea. Most notably, China
has purchased Russian submarines, 66 and high-ranking officers of the
Chinese Navy have called for the construction of a nuclear-powered air-
60. Romulo, supra note 4 at 133.
61. Id.
62. Singapore Declaration of 1992, Jan. 28, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 498, 499 (1992).
63. Deborah A. Haas, Out of Others' Shadows: ASEAN Moves Toward Greater Re-
gional Cooperation in the Face of the EC and NAFTA, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 809,
859-62.
64. Law of the Sea, supra note 1, art. 279, 21 1.L.M. 1322.
65. Id., art. 284, 21 I.L.M. 1322.
66. Tom Grimmer, Asia: Peace Has Been a Boon for East Asia's Economies - South
China Sea Remains Nagging Problem, FINANCIAL POST, Apr. 19, 1995.
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craft carrier capable of carrying 50 airplanes. 67 In addition to this, both
China and Vietnam have signed contracts with oil companies for the
exploration of the area around the islands. 68 Protests by China and
Vietnam in reaction to each other's actions have only resulted in re-
sponses that further exacerbate the situation.
69
Given the failure of China or Vietnam to initiate arbitration despite
the rising tensions in the area, it seems more likely that one of the
other parties to the dispute, one which cannot compete militarily with
China and Vietnam, might initiate compulsory binding arbitration un-
der Part XV. A smaller state such a Malaysia or the Philippines would
gain a considerable advantage by initiating arbitration because it re-
moves the military element from the equation.
Parties to Law of the Sea are understood to have accepted arbitra-
tion of their maritime disputes under Part XV of the Convention. If the
state does not want to have disputes to which it is a party settled under
the provisions of the Law of the Sea, it must declare that this is the case
at the signing of the Convention. 70 Neither China nor Vietnam did this
when they signed the Convention. Therefore, the dispute resolution
provisions of the Law of the Sea apply to them and disputes to which
they are a party.
Under Part XV of the Law of the Sea, a party to a dispute concern-
ing the interpretation or application of the Law of the Sea may submit
it to compulsory proceedings resulting in a binding decision. Article 286
states that "where no settlement has been reached by recourse to Sec-
tion 1 [voluntary negotiations outside the framework of the Law of the
Sea], [disputes may] be submitted at the request of any party of the dis-
pute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section."71
Article 287(3) augments this by declaring that "[a] State Party, which is
a party to a dispute not covered by a declaration in force, shall be
deemed to have accepted arbitration in accordance with Annex VII.' '72
Although both Annexes V and VII contain provisions for the arbi-
tration of disputes, Annex VII is the Annex that would be applied to
this dispute. Article 1 of Annex V clearly states that "[i]f the parties to
a dispute have agreed.. .to submit it to conciliation under this section,
any such party may institute the proceedings by written notification
addressed to the other party or parties to the dispute."73 Clearly, if
67. China Must Have Nuclear Flattop, Naval Officer Says, Kyodo News International,
Jan 30, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 2224358.
68. Belier, supra note 5 at 297.
69. See Id.
70. Law of the Sea, supra note 1, art. 298, 21 I.L.M. 1325.
71. Id., art. 286, 21 I.L.M. 1322.
72. Id., art. 287(3), 21 I.L.M. 1322.
73. Id., Annex V, art. 1, 21 I.L.M. 1344 (Under art. 318, the Annexes to the Conven-
tion form an integral part of the Convention and have the same status as the articles of
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Vietnam and China voluntarily agreed to settle their dispute through
arbitration, Annex V would apply. However, that is not case, and it
seems most likely that any arbitration that takes place under the Law
of the Sea will be compulsory arbitration that is initiated unilaterally,
as envisioned in Annex VII.
Under the provisions of Annex VII, "any party to a dispute may
submit the dispute to the arbital procedure provided for in this Annex
by written notification addressed to the other party or parties to the
dispute."74 The Annex then states that "[i]f one of the parties to the
dispute does not appear before the arbital tribunal or fails to defend its
case, the other party may request the tribunal to continue and to make
its award."75 It appears that if a third party were to initiate arbitration
under Annex VII, China and Vietnam would be compelled to defend
their claims not only because they are bound to as signatories of the
Convention, but also because it is in their interest to do so in order to
state their case before the tribunal.
Finally, if the claims of the Chinese and Vietnamese to the islands
are as substantial as both parties claim they are, there is no reason that
they should be reluctant to participate in arbitration under Annex VII.
Although the party initiating the arbitration may gain a psychological
advantage by starting the proceedings, this is offset by the rest of the
provisions of Annex VII. For example, although the nation initiating
the arbitration is allowed to appoint an arbitrator, that person must be
named from a list of arbitrators to which all signatories are allowed to
contribute four names. 76 If there are more than two parties, as in the
case of the Spratlys, each party may appoint a member of the panel,
and the panel increases in size so that the number of jointly-appointed
arbitrators exceeds the number of arbitrators who have been appointed
by the parties to the dispute. The jointly-appointed members of the ar-
bitration panel must be appointed by agreement between the parties to
the dispute, and cannot be nationals of either of the parties. The Presi-
dent of the panel must be chosen from among the jointly-appointed
members of the panel. 77
Once the arbitrators have been appointed, the panel is left to its
own devices to determine what its operating procedures will be. 78 The
only substantive restriction that is placed on the panel is that in the
course of reaching its decision, it must apply the "Convention and other
the main body of the Convention. Id., art. 318, 21 I.L.M. 1328).
74. Id., Annex VII, art. 1, 21 I.L.M. 1350.
75. Id., Annex VII, art. 9, 21 I.L.M. 1351.
76. Id., Annex VII, art. 2, 21 I.L.M. 1350.
77. Id.
78, Id., Annex VII, art. 5, 21 I.L.M. 1351.
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rules of international law not incompatible with it."7 9 However, this
does not preclude the panel from deciding a case ex aequo et bono.80 In
short, the panel may act in equity if it feels it is necessary to do so.
V. APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Since 1992, tensions in the Spratlys have increased dramatically
despite numerous calls for the parties to find a peaceful resolution to
the dispute.8 1 Specifically, actions taken by China have raised tensions
in the area.
In 1992, China entered into an agreement with Crestone Energy
Development Corporation of Denver for the exploration of a 25,155
square kilometer area around the Spratlys. The Vietnamese responded
by negotiating a contract between their national oil company, Pet-
rovietnam, and Nopec, a Norwegian company, also for exploration of the
area around the Spratlys for oil.82 Tensions between the countries es-
calated to the point that shots were exchanged between their Border
Guards at the Friendship Gate.
8 3
Second, China has recently begun to probe the area of the islands
claimed by the Philippines with its navy and fishing fleets.84 This pat-
tern of action by the Chinese led to the arrest of 62 Chinese fishermen
in March of this year for straying into waters claimed by the Philip-
pines and fishing there illegally. In addition, two Chinese boats were
impounded by the Philippine Navy, which discovered 80 sea turtles (an
endangered species), dynamite, and cyanide.8 5 Furthermore, China has
seized a reef claimed by the Philippines,8 6 and has built what the Phil-
ippines claims is a naval support installation on it.87 These actions
have led to speculation that "China may be readying itself for a military
strike against the Philippines." 88
Finally, the Chinese have broadened the scope of the Spratlys dis-
79. Id., art. 293, 21 I.L.M. 1324.
80. Id.
81. See Thailand: Banharn Wants Gov't to Host Talks on Spratlys, BANGKOK POST,
Apr. 4, 1995, at 7 (Thailand urges joint development of the islands); Thailand: Chuan Of-
fers to Help Settle Spratly Islands Conflict, BANGKOK POST, Apr. 6, 1995, at 7 (Thailand
offers to act as mediator in negotiations over the Spratlys); Japan: Japan, Vietnam Agree
to Enhance Ties, JIJI PRESS, Apr. 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC database (Viet-
nam expresses hope for settlement under international law).
82. Beller, supra note 5, at 297.
83. Id.
84. Grimmer, supra note 66.
85. Slow Boil in the Spratlys, ASIAWEEK, April 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC
database.
86. China: Europe Seeks China's Favour, ECONOMIST, Apr. 22, 1995.
87. Ruben Alabastro, Philippines: Manila Alleges Chinese "Duplicity" in Spratlys,
REUTERS ECONOMIC NEWS, Apr. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC database.
88. China: Europe Seeks China's Favour, supra note 86.
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pute by drawing Indonesia and Malaysia further into the dispute.
China recently published maps showing the Indonesian archipelago of
Natuna, which is also located in the South China Sea,8 9 as a part of
China's sovereign territory.90 This claim by the Chinese threatens to
draw the Indonesians into the dispute at a time when Indonesia has
been trying to act as mediator between China and the members of
ASEAN involved in the dispute. 91 China has not responded to Indone-
sian protests regarding this matter. 92 With regards to Malaysia, Chi-
nese fishing boats have been boarded and warning shots have been
fired by the Malaysian Navy in response to Chinese fishing off the coast
of Sarawak, south of the Spratlys.
93
In short, Chinese actions in the South China Sea are such that
Philippine Secretary of Defense Renato De Villa has stated that
"China's latest activities ... appear to reflect a two-pronged strategy,
that is slowly but steadily moving into the disputed territory while
talking peace with its rival claimants."94 In addition, the actions have
reinforced fears in Asia that China will emerge from the Cold War as an
expansionist superpower. 95  A recent ASEAN-Chinese consultative
meeting during which the situation in the Spratly Islands was dis-
cussed only reinforced these fears, and the ASEAN delegates left not
having made any progress with regards to the Chinese, but determined
to stand -together against what they perceive as the growing Chinese
threat. As one observer noted, "[i]t's time that the line in the water was
drawn against the Chinese."
96
These tensions are further heightened by China's rejection of mul-
tilateral talks proposed by ASEAN. To date, the Chinese have insisted
that negotiations between the parties be on a bilateral basis, breaking
up the proceedings in a way that might be advantageous to the Chinese.
With the addition of Vietnam to ASEAN in July of 1997, however, it is
possible that bilateral negotiations could take place bilaterally on a
China-ASEAN level.97 Although this might satisfy China's demands
that the talks be bilateral, a byproduct of this arrangement might be an
increase in tensions between ASEAN and its powerful neighbor to the
north.
89. Indonesia: No Chinese Reply to Indonesia's Natuna Question, REUTERS, Apr. 10,
1995, available in LEXIS, ALLNWS database.
90. Greg Earl, Indonesia: Steps Up China Sea Patrols, AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL
REVIEW, Apr. 12, 1995, at 12.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Slow Boil in the Spratlys, supra note 85.
94. Earl, supra note 90.
95: Lindsay Murdoch, China: Islands Dispute Fuels Fear of Chinese Intent,
MELBOURNE AGE, Apr. 3, 1995, at 12.
96. Slow Boil in the Spratlys, supra note 85.
97. Id.
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The increased tensions in the area make it more important than
ever that the Spratly islands dispute be submitted to arbitration under
Annex VII of the Law of the Sea. As described above, these proceedings
have the advantages of being both compulsory and binding, so any solu-
tion reached would be permanent and involve all of the parties to the
dispute.
Under paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83, the parties of the dispute
must "make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a
practical nature" during the period in which a final agreement is being
negotiated. 98 In the case of the Spratly Islands, this might involve ei-
ther a moratorium on the development of natural resources or an
agreement for the joint development of the natural resources in the
area.99 Already, there have been suggestions from parties to the dis-
pute and other nations in the region that the parties should look into
the possibility of joint development. 100 As precedent, advocates of joint
development could point to the arrangements agreed upon by Malaysia
and Thailand for the joint development of natural resources in areas in
which their territorial waters overlap.
10 1
In the case of the Spratlys, it is essential that the parties negotiate
an interim agreement pending the conclusion of arbitration under the
Law of the Sea. Not only are they required to under Articles 74 and 83,
but the complexity of the situation and the length of time that it will
take to negotiate a settlement almost demand it.102 Due to the in-
volvement of six rival claimants, a dispute that might not be particu-
larly difficult to resolve has become one of the most complex in recent
history.
The fact that ownership of the islands is contested complicates the
job of boundary delimitation immensely. Almost by definition, bound-
ary delimitation is done after it has been determined which nations own
which pieces of land. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases are a good
example of this.103 In that case, it was clear where the parties continen-
tal shelves began and ended, the problem was that they overlapped. In
the case of the Spratlys, there will have to be two steps taken before the
dispute is settled. First, the parties will have to determine which na-
98. Law of the Sea, supra note 1, art. 74, 21 I.L.M. 1284; Id., art 83, 21 I.L.M. 1286.
99. Rainer Lagoni, Interim Measures Pending Maritime Delimitation Agreements, 78
AM. J. INT'L L. 345, 360-62.
100. See Spratlys: Taiwan Calls for Joint Development, PERIScOPE DAILY DEFENSE
NEWS CAPSULES, Sept. 8, 1993; Bratislava: China Wants Common Management of
Spratlys - Qian, REUTERS, Apr. 4, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Int-News database; Thai-
land: Chuan Offers to Help Settle Spratly Islands Conflict, supra note 81.
101. Thailand: Chuan Offers to Help Settle Spratly Islands Conflict, supra note 81.
102. Lagoni, supra note 99, at 346-47 (noting that the time needed to reach a decision
in recent maritime delimitation cases has ranged from three years eight years, and that
the ICJ expects that more complicated cases will take a longer time to decide).
103. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den, F.R.G. v. Neth), 1969 I.C.J. 3.
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tions own which islands. Only after that is done will they be able to de-
termine where the boundaries between their overlapping zones should
be drawn.
It is possible that the arbital panel established under Annex VII
could address both issues, in which case the proceedings of the panel
could reasonably be expected to last for some time. If this happens, it is
essential that an interim agreement be established due to the poten-
tially lengthy period over which the talks would take place.
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of the rising tensions in the region due to the dispute over
the Spratly Islands, arbitration under Part XV of the Law of the Sea
seems to be the best way to settle the dispute. Even if the ASEAN na-
tions submit the dispute for arbitration as a group, it is not clear that
China will comply with an arbitrated settlement. Like many interna-
tional agreements, the Convention on the Law of the Sea lacks an en-
forcement mechanism, and because of this, there is no guarantee that
China will comply with the "compulsory" procedures outlined in Annex
VII.
Given that this is the case, and understanding that it would take a
prohibitively long time to settle the dispute under Annex VII, it may be
best to adopt the course of action advocated by the Thais, Indonesians,
and (at times) the Chinese: joint development. If a program of joint de-
velopment is agreed on, exploitation could begin relatively soon, and all
of the nations would benefit. In addition to economic benefits, potential
bloodshed between China and the other parties would be averted.
Advocates of this approach to the situation can point to the Ems-
Dollart Treaty of 1960 as an example of what could be done. In that
treaty, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany agreed to
joint development of oil and gas reserves in the estuary of the Ems
river.104 A more persuasive example might be the agreement reached
between Japan and South Korea, in which they agreed to the joint de-
velopment of the continental shelf adjacent to the two countries. 105
Once joint development is agreed upon, it may be the case that the is-
lands themselves could be set aside for joint administration, leaving
aside the sovereignty issue altogether.
In any case, either through the mechanisms of the Law of the Sea,
or though an agreement for joint development, it is essential that a so-
lution to the Spratly dispute be reached in keeping with the spirit of the
U.N. Charter. If this is not done, China's actions in the area may soon
prove that Thucydides was correct when he wrote "in fact the strong do
104. Lagoni, supra note 99, at 361.
105. Id.
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what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to
accept."10 6
106. THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 360 (Rex Warner, trans.).

